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Abstract: I argue that various derivations of the Born probability rule within strictly 
unitary quantum mechanics implicitly use anthropic constraints on the properties of the 
probabilities, but without proposing an ensemble from which those constraints limit a 
selection. An argument by Mallah obtains the Born probabilities explicitly for standard 
unitary dynamics but via postulating a hypothetical extra noise-like component of the 
quantum state. I argue that the implicit anthropic constraints required for well-behaved 
probability rules would select for a state of the sort Mallah proposes. 
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Introduction 
The central problem in the interpretation of quantum mechanics is that the unitary time 
evolution unambiguously predicts outcomes which are supersets of the observed 
outcomes.1 Observed outcomes have well-defined values of macroscopic parameters, 
while formal unitary outcomes do not. The relative frequencies of occurrence of 
observing any particular sets of macro outcomes are well known to follow the Born rule, 
i.e. to be proportional to the measure of the part of the formal outcome which has those 
properties. In traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics, a collapse process is more 
or less explicitly introduced whereby the quantum state shrinks to one or another of its 
macroscopically definite components, with the choice of which one survives following 
the Born probability rule. The Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) dispenses with this 
unobserved non-unitary non-local collapse process.1 Although the resulting picture is 
mathematically more coherent, it lacks precisely the ill-defined stage at which the Born 
rule can be introduced by fiat. Collapse-free accounts ought then to be able to predict the 
observed occurrence frequencies by some argument based directly on the formalism. 
Here I shall argue that it might do so only conditionally, with the conditions determined 
anthropically. 
 
Implicitly Anthropic Arguments in Many Worlds 
The MWI is typically introduced via simplified toy decoherence events, in which some 
initially coherent quantum state decoheres into a discrete list of macro-distinct 
components, each entangled with a different version of the environment. The obvious 
way to infer frequencies of occurrence in such a picture is simply to count “worlds”, i.e. 
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distinct decoherent outcomes. That procedure is well-known to give nothing like the Born 
rule. (see e.g. 2) Various arguments have been made to the effect that nonetheless the 
Born rule must be followed. (see, e.g. 3) In general, those arguments take the form of 
assuming that the occurrence frequencies are describable by factorizable probabilities 
assigned to events, so, for example, the probability that Schrödinger’s cat lives on 
Tuesday will not depend on whether it acquires quantum fleas on Wednesday. The 
probability then becomes a conserved flowing quantity. For non-trivial quantum spaces 
the quantum measure is the only such quantity. (see, e.g.4 5) 
 
The problem with such an argument is that it assumes that probabilities must be well-
behaved, in that the probability of Tuesday’s outcomes does not change after Tuesday. In 
some versions of the argument, intersubjective agreement on a universal probability is 
also assumed (e.g. 5), even though the need for a probabilistic description of decoherent 
components arises entirely from the division of the quantum events into an 
observer+observed part and an external environment part, so that the observer-
independence of the probabilities is not an obvious given.  Since in outcome-counting, 
Wednesday’s fleas do alter the relative counts of live and dead cats after Tuesday’s 
experiment2, it’s clear that the simplest outcome-counting interpretation cannot fit our 
observations.  
 
Should we then simply say that outcome-counting has nothing to do with occurrence 
frequencies? By way of analogy, if in classical physics one were to grant the common-
sense assumption that blackbody radiation is finite, one could derive the T4 law. The 
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problem would be that such an assumption makes no sense in the given framework, so 
that following this comforting procedure would be a way to avoid discovering quantum 
mechanics. One should examine whether there is any way to make sense of the observed 
outcomes in the framework of the fundamental theory, rather than simply assume that the 
implications of the framework must be reasonable.  
 
Wallace3 has made perhaps the most pertinent criticism of outcome-counting algorithms. 
He points out that under any realistic circumstances observers such as ourselves will 
never have even a single “world” if by world we mean a decoherent branch of the 
quantum state, i.e. a pure diagonal term in a density matrix, traced over the environment, 
which remains stable in a given basis for long enough to represent a state of mind. 
There’s just far too much decoherence going on all the time.  We’re qualitatively 
dissimilar to the toy case used to initially introduce the MWI. Therefore we must 
construct some argument concerning the probabilities without hoping to count discrete 
branches. Wallace argues that simply adopting a measure-based probability for operator 
values is then justified. The inapplicability of simple count-based arguments does not, 
however, logically imply the applicability of measure-based arguments.6 
 
To claim that the Born rule must hold in order for there to be objective factorizable 
probabilities does not seem adequate, since we have a nominally complete fundamental 
form of quantum theory, which ought to fully specify its own implications. One could 
argue that anthropic constraints require that any probabilities have the well-behaved 
properties of those we observe, in order to be accessible to anything like a mind, but 
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anthropic arguments cannot be justified unless there is some ensemble on which the 
anthropic selection occurs. Thus the anthropic argument that the probabilities must be 
reasonable would seem to be quite irrelevant to the Born rule, since the usual sorts of 
ensembles considered all share the Born rule. I shall argue that this impression is not 
necessarily correct. 
 
Mallah’s Unitary Account of the Born Rule 
There have been several approaches to deriving the intrinsic non-linearity of the Born 
rule from the purely linear dynamics of the quantum formalism. The first, by Hanson7, 
considered non-linear criteria for the experiencability of a “world” in a background of 
other components of a quantum state. Hanson’s suggestion seemed unworkable in detail 
since there was no reason for the different decoherence processes in different macro-
branches to match well enough to give a fixed ratio of sub-branch counts to net quantum 
measure, even if we accepted the unrealistic idea of discrete sub-branches.  
 
Mallah 8 has proposed a different framework for generating a frequency ratio from 
measure. The frequencies to be counted, as in a variety of “many minds” versions of the 
Many Worlds approach, are the frequencies of independent thoughts. Mallah takes a fully 
functionalist approach, treating a thought as a robust computation performed by some 
subset of a quantum system.  In any such computation the “signal” must exceed any 
irrelevant “noise”. Mallah argues that if the quantum state consists of two components, 
one signal-like and the other noise-like, the Born rule can emerge directly from this 
consideration without introducing any non-unitary dynamics.  
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Mallah’s argument goes roughly as follows. Say that the noise has a white spectrum in 
any standard coordinate representation. In order for the signal to beat the noise, one must 
average over enough of the coordinate space. Standard statistics then requires averaging 
over a volume inversely proportional to the squared magnitude of the signal. Thus the 
ratios of numbers of robust independent computations corresponding to different 
outcomes would obey the Born rule, regardless of the somewhat arbitrary resolution 
criteria used to describe which computations are independent. 
 
Perhaps the most obvious difficulty with Mallah’s idea is that there is no independent 
reason to postulate that the existence of the white-noise background component. On the 
other hand, the initially low-entropy component of which we usually keep track itself has 
uncertain origins. Modern cosmology has not entirely obviated Boltzmann’s early 
speculation9 that the explanation for the statistical peculiarity of our state might 
ultimately be anthropic.(See discussion in 10.) 
 
Combining Mallah with Anthropic Constraints 
So let us now put together the ingredients. The usual arguments that the Born 
probabilities must hold are implicitly though not explicitly anthropic. They lack any 
explanatory mechanism with parameters on which anthropic post-selection might occur. 
Mallah’s explanation has a mechanism with an adjustable collection of properties, those 
of the “noise” component of the starting state, but lacks any account of why just the right 
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sort of component is found to give Born probabilities. I am proposing the obvious 
combination of these approaches.  
 
Only Born probabilities have the sort of properties that a rational actor might be able to 
track, in particular the factorization of probabilities for sequential events. Our only good 
account (other than assertions by fiat) for the emergence of Born probabilities in unitary 
quantum mechanics requires that Mallah’s  hypothetical background noise be part of the 
state. Therefore standard anthropic reasoning would require that of the ensemble of all 
states (all presumably realized in some abstract space) only the Mallah-style states could 
be experienced by anyone who could begin to discuss such questions. Therefore that’s the 
type of state in which we conduct this discussion. 
 
Does this proposal accomplish anything beyond tying together some loose ends in the 
Many Worlds interpretation? At an even more speculative level, it may connect with 
another prominent loose end in cosmology. A wide variety of cosmological models have 
trouble accounting for why our universe is flat and homogeneous on the widest 
observable scales, far beyond known anthropic requirements. (See 11 for an informal 
discussion.) If the Born rule itself is anthropically required and derived from actual 
physical interaction with statistically homogeneous quantum fields propagating at up to 
the speed of light, anthropic constraints on large-scale homogeneity might extend to 
horizons. 
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The first obvious question for any such proposal is whether it has observational 
implications beyond retrodicting the already known properties of the world. I cannot yet 
specify any such new predictions. Nevertheless, any scenario in which the Born 
probabilities emerge from contingent properties of the quantum state allows in principle 
for the possibility that they will not be exact and universal. 
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